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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(j)(2001), as 
an appeal from a grant of Summary Judgment by the Fourth Judicial District Court of Wasatch 
County, State of Utah, entered on May 3, 2007. This appeal was "poured-over" to the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)Q)(2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the 1993 amendments unconstitutionally 
immunized emergency response vehicles from tort liability? 
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that U.L.A. §41 -6-14(1993) 
applied to completely immunize Wasatch County? 
3. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the Wasatch County Sheriff s Manual did not 
apply to prohibit Jensen's reckless speeding? 
4. Whether the trial court erred in accepting the Bonner affidavit and in striking the Robson 
affidavit? 
The standard of review for all issues is de novo, as the case was decided on summary 
judgment. See Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72; 2003 UT 19, Tfl4 (summary judgment 
question of immunity of emergency response vehicles reviewed de novo). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of an automobile accident in Midway, Utah, between Clegg and 
Jensen, a Wasatch County Sheriff deputy. Clegg sued for his injuries and damages. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
Clegg brought suit against Wasatch County and Bruce Jensen, the driver. After discovery, 
Wasatch County filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the Fourth District 
Court, Judge Fred Howard. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts on Appeal 
Cast of Main Characters: 
Steve Clegg, the plaintiff, who was driving out of a private driveway intending to turn 
eastbound on the main road from Midway, Utah, to Heber City, Utah. 
Bruce Jensen, a Wasatch County Sheriffs deputy, who was responding to a call driving 
eastbound on from Midway, Utah, to the Lake Creek area. 
Ron Probert, accident ^constructionist for Wasatch County. 
Newell Knight, accident ^constructionist for Clegg. 
The Accident: 
On July 16, 2002, at approximately 3:22 p.m., Wasatch County Sheriffs Deputy Travis 
Jensen was dispatched to a motorcycle accident in the Lake Creek/Timber Lakes area of Wasatch 
County. (R. 13 8, f 1). Jensen was at a Chevron gas station in Midway City, Utah at that moment. (R. 
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123, Jensen depo. p. 10,1. 20-21). Jensen activated his overhead lights, siren, wigwag headlights, 
and headed east on SR 113. (R. 122, Jensen depo. p. 19, 1. 22-24). Clegg was coming out of a 
condominium complex, planning to make a left-hand turn onto SR 113 and go westbound into 
Midway. Clegg approached SR 113 via 750 East, which is controlled by a stop sign where it 
intersects with SR 113. (R. 137,1J5). 
Clegg came to a complete stop at the stop sign. He did not see any traffic on SR 113 as he 
approached. From where he stopped, it "was difficult" to see traffic on SR 113. (R. 109, Clegg depo. 
p. 22,1.9-15). He "cautiously" pulled forward from the stop sign for better visibility of oncoming 
traffic. (R. 137, %6; R. 209, Complaint,! 10; R- 109, Clegg depo. p. 22, L 16-17). Clegg pulled 
forward another five feet to "see if there was any cars coming". (R. 109, Clegg depo. p. 22,1.16-22). 
Clegg came to a complete stop behind the white [fog] line. (R. 108, Clegg depo. p. 26,1. 7-15). At 
that time, he saw Jensen "coming at me, sliding with all fours locked". (R. 107, Clegg depo. p. 31, 
1.9-11). Clegg was not on his cell phone, and had his radio on very low. (R. 137., ^ 7). Clegg did not 
hear or see the lights or siren of Jensen's police car until it was skidding toward his own car. (Id.). 
Jensen's version is that he saw Clegg approach the stop sign, slow to almost a stop, and then 
"continue out", presumably toward the fog line. (R. 187, Jensen depo. p. 39,1. 7-25). Jensen saw 
Clegg checking for traffic "coming from the other direction". Jensen "didn't think he saw me" so 
he "was starting to brake and look for an alternative route". (Id.). Jensen "didn't know if [Clegg] was 
going to continue out or see [him] and stop". (Id.). Jensen then "made the decision to try and go 
behind him because I couldn't go around in front of him [Clegg]". (Id., at p. 40, 1. 5-7). Jensen 
admitted that, in hindsight, if he had gone "straight" and "slightly over", the accident "may have 
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been avoidable". (R. 186, Jensen depo. p. 43,1. 1-19). 
Jensen's approach toward Clegg took him around a blind corner, which he negotiated at "a 
high rate of speed". (Complaint, R. 209, ^[11). There were some "pine trees" that obscured his vision 
of Clegg as Jensen rounded the curve. (R. 190, Jensen depo. p. 27,16-25, p. 28,1.1-5). Jensen stated 
that he "didn't see [Clegg] until he came out from behind the tree". (Id.). The speed limit as Jensen 
approached was 35 m.p.h., (R. 209, Tfl2), Immediately prior to Clegg's position, the speed limit 
changed from 35 m.p.h. to 50 m.p.h. (Id., TJ13), The Utah Highway Patrol, which investigated the 
accident, calculated Jensen's speed at 78.12 m.p.h. (R. 152, Probert depo. p.20,1.6-18; Jensen depo. 
p. 24,1. 6-22). Jensen conceded that he "can't say that I disagree" with that speed calculation (R. 
191, Jensen depo. p. 24.1. 6-25).though Jensen stated that his last recollection of speed before the 
accident was "between 55 and 60 m.p.h.". (R. 191, Jensen depo. p. 23,1. 19-25, p. 24,1. 1). Probert, 
hired to re-construct the accident by Wasatch County, stated that that estimate was "low" using an 
average "drag factor". (Id.) Probert calculated that Jensen was going 80 m.p.h. when he began to 
perceive and react to Clegg using an "average drag factor". (R. 150, Probert depo. p. 27,1. 21-25). 
Probert admitted that Jensen was going at least 55 m.p.h. under any hypothetical set of assumptions 
about the accident. (Id., p. 26,1. 21-24). 
Newell Knight, a well-known accident reconstructionist (now deceased), opined that Jensen 
was speeding. (R. 173, ELmght depo. p. 32,1. 22-23). Second, he stated that Jensen "had time and 
distance to avoid the accident by reducing speed, responding to Clegg sooner than having other 
options". (Id., 1. 23-25). Knight further concluded that if Jensen were going 60 m.p.h., "he would 
have stopped short of impact". (R. 170, Knight depo. p. 43,1. 20-23). Knight based his testimony 
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on the assumption that Jensen was going 78 miles per hour as he began skidding. (R. 168, Knight 
depo. p. 51, 1. 3-6). Knight testified that if Jensen had not been speeding, he could have driven 
around Clegg on either side. (R. 167, Knight depo. p. 55,1. 18-25, p. 56,1.1-8; R. 166, p. 59,1. 3-4). 
Knight calculated that if Jensen had been traveling as much as 65 m.p.h., he could have stopped to 
avoid hitting Clegg. (Id., Knight depo., p. 60,1. 13-25; p. 61,1. 1-25; p. 62,1.1). 
Wasatch County Manual: 
Jensen confessed that "Our [Wasatch County's] policy states that we are allowed to exceed 
20 miles an hour over the posted speed limit in any populated area of the county or in any city". (R. 
186, Jensen depo., p. 44,1.1-3). Actually, the opposite was true; emergency response vehicles were 
NOT allowed to exceed 20 miles an hour over the posted speed limit in any populated area of the 
country or in any city. The Wasatch County Policy and Procedure Manual ("Manual"), in fact, states 
that "No deputy will drive at more than 20 MPH over the posted speed limit in any populated area 
of the county or in any city. No deputy will drive at any speed that is faster than is reasonable and 
prudent considering the existing conditions", (R. 202, at 3-3-01.04(1) "Department Restrictions on 
Emergency Driving". Apparently, Jensen was completely confused as to Wasatch County's policies 
on speed in emergency response. Notably, the Wasatch County Manual states that"[ A]t no time will 
any deputy operate a vehicle in an unsafe manner". (Id., at 204, 3-3-01.01). Further, the Wasatch 
County Manual adopts the 1991 version of U.C.A. 41-6-14 as its legal standard. 
SUMMARY OF STATUTORY HISTORY 
Up until 1990, there was a general duty to exercise reasonable care imposed upon operators 
of emergency vehicles. A specific exception to this general duty was added in 1990, which 
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completely immunizes emergency vehicles in vehicle pursuits. This exception was found to be 
unconstitutional as violating Utah Constitution, Article 1 § 11 in Day v. State, 980 P.2d 1171; 1999 
UT 46. In 1991, the complete immunity for emergency vehicle pursuits was deleted entirely. In 1993, 
a new limited immunity for emergency vehicles was added, re-instating the immunity added in 1990, 
in the instance of emergency vehicle pursuits. Further, the general requirement for all emergency 
vehicles to exercise reasonable care was deleted, with the exception that emergency vehicles.may 
only pass stop signs or red lights "only after slowing down as maybe necessary for safe operation". 
The effect of the 1993 amendments is that emergency vehicles are completely immune, except when 
in vehicle pursuit, or when passing stop signs or red lights. In 2004, the general duty for emergency 
vehicles to exercise reasonable care is re-instated. 
The Law pre-1990 
Statutory provisions: 
U.C.A. §63-30-7(1989): 
Immunity from suit of all governmental agencies is waived . . . provided, 
however, that this section shall not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as 
defined by law and while being driven in accordance with the requirements of 
Section 41-6-14. 
U.C.A. §41-6-14(1988) 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down 
as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger life 
or property; 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehicle 
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apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146, or uses 
a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in front of 
the vehicle. 
(a) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with regard to the 
safety of all persons, or protect the operator from the consequences of an arbitrary 
exercise of the privileges. 
Pre-1990 Summary: 
An operator of an emergency vehicle may only disregard a stop sign or red light "after 
slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation"; or exceed the posted speed limit "if the 
operator does not endanger life or property"; and has a "duty to operate the vehicle with regard to 
the safety of all persons". 
The Law from 1990-1991 
Statutes: 
U.C.A. §63-30-7(1990): 
(l)(a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other 
equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority. 
(b) This subsection does not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles 
as defined by law and while being driven in accordance with the requirements of 
Section 41-6-14. 
(2)(a) All governmental entities employing peace officers retain and do not 
waive immunity from liability for civil damages for personal injury or death or for 
damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated by an 
actual or suspected violator of law who is being, or believes he is being, or has been 
pursued by a peace officer employed by the governmental entity in a motor vehicle. 
U.C.A. §41-6-14(1988) unchanged. 
1990-1991 Summary: 
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Liability for negligent operation of an emergency vehicle is retained, except that a new 
exception is added creating absolute immunity for "hot pursuit" cases. 
The Law from 1991-1993 
Statutes: 
U.C.A. §63-30-10(15)(1991): 
[Immunity is retained for] The operation of an emergency vehicle, while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements of 41-6-14. 
U.C.A. §41-6-14(1988) unchanged. 
1991-1993 Summary: 
The law as it existed before the 1990 amendments is reinstated. An operator of an emergency 
vehicle has a "duty to operate the vehicle with regard to the safety of all persons". 41-6-14(1988). 
The Law from 1993-2004 
U.C.A. §63-30-10(15)(1991) unchanged. 
U.C.A. §41-6-14(1993): 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down 
as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits; or 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a vehicle pursuit, apply only when the 
vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as 
defined under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle. 
(4) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle involved in any vehicle pursuit apply only when: 
(a) [compliance with 41-6-14]; 
(b) [written vehicle pursuit policy]; 
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(c) [emergency vehicle operator has been trained]; 
(d) [pursuit policy conforms to POST standards]. 
1993-2003 Summary: 
A limited immunity is added for vehicle pursuit (Section 4). Sec. 41-6-14 is amended to 
delete reference to using care for safety of persons while exceeding the speed limit, and to delete the 
general statutory duty to use "regard to the safety of all persons". The requirement for "slowing down 
as may be necessary for safe operation" while passing a stop sign or red light is retained. 
The Law from 2004-Present 
U.C.A. §63-30-10(15)(1991)isre-codifiedatU.C.A. §63-30d-301(5)(o)(2004), unchanged. 
U.C.A. §41-6-14(2004): 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down 
as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits; 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle, who is not involved in any vehicle pursuit apply only when: 
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-
146; or 
(b) uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is visible 
from in front of the vehicle. 
(5) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to act as a reasonably prudent emergency 
vehicle operator in like circumstances. 
2004-Present Summary: 
The statutory requirement to exercise due care when operating an emergency vehicle, not in 
"pursuit", is re-instated in more elegant language than the original version prior to 1990 (Section 5). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Legislature had originally decreed a blanket immunity for all emergency vehicles. That 
was struck down pursuant to Section 1, Article 11 of the Utah Constitution, "Open Courts" 
provision, in Day v. State, 980 P.2d 1171; 1999 UT 46. The Legislature at first conceded, and 
repealed the immunity. Then, it performed a sort of legislative CPR on the idea, and resuscitated it 
in 1993. Then, once again realizing that it was still unconstitutional, the Legislature brought the 
statute into line in 2004. Unfortunately for Clegg, his accident occurred before the 2004 
amendments. However, the Day ruling still stands, and invalidates the 1993 statute. The trial court 
erred by upholding it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE 1993 AMENDMENTS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNIZED 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE VEHICLES FROM TORT LIABILITY 
A. "Open Courts" Provision - Utah Constitution, Art. 11: 
The Utah Supreme Court considered the 1990 amendment, which completely immunized 
emergency vehicles while engaged in pursuit, while otherwise retaining liability for negligent 
operation of emergency vehicles. In Day v. State, 980 P.2d 1171; 1999 UT 46, the Court held that 
when the Legislature completely abrogated any claim against an emergency vehicle engaged in 
pursuit, it violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. The Day court relied upon the 
Berry1 analysis in striking down the 1990 amendments. The first part of the Beny analysis is whether 
1
 Berry ex. rel Beny v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
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a substitute remedy has been provided in place of an existing legal remedy. The 1993 amendment 
provided no substitute legal remedy for completely immunizing an emergency vehicle which speeds 
or fails to follow directional markings, or otherwise fails to exercise reasonable care in cases not 
involving running a red light, stop sign, or engaging in pursuit. 
This triggers the second part of the Berry analysis, which is whether there is a clear social 
or economic evil to be eliminated. There is no legislative history indicating that the Legislature even 
knew it was abrogating a remedy, let alone any history that it was addressing a clear social or 
economic evil. If it had considered the question, there is no plausible basis for concluding that there 
is no clear social or economic evil posed by pursuit cases, Day, at, yet finding one for emergency 
vehicles speeding in a negligent fashion and negligently injuring an innocent member of the public, 
but not finding one for emergency vehicles running stop signs or red lights. 
Even if there were a clear social and economic evil from liability for negligent operation of 
emergency vehicles, the elimination of an existing remedy must not be an arbitrary or unreasonable 
means for achieving the objective, the third Berry test. Drawing a distinction between negligent 
operation of an emergency vehicle while engaged in pursuit, or when running a stop sign or red light, 
on the one hand, and any other negligent operation of an emergency vehicle, is completely arbitrary 
and unreasonable. There is simply no principled distinction between the two categories of liability. 
Neither is more reprehensible than the other; neither is more costly to society than the other; neither 
is more difficult to deter or compensate. The complete abrogation of liability for negligent operation 
of emergency vehicles while speeding and otherwise driving unreasonably is not justified under any 
of the three Berry tests. 
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The most recent case fully considering an Article I, Section 11 analysis is Juddv. Drezga, 
2004 UT 91. Judd considered the $250,000 cap on non-economic damages for medical malpractice. 
Judd reviewed the considerable legislative findings about the evil of increased liability for non-
economic damages from medical malpractice, and stated that "When an issue is fairly debatable, we 
cannot say that the legislature has overstepped its constitutional bounds when it determined there was 
a crisis needing a remedy," Judd, at Tfl5. There was no debate about abrogating a certain sub 
category of liability for negligent emergency vehicles, let alone a fair one. 
B. Uniform Operation of Laws 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24, also states that "All laws of a general nature 
shall have unifomi operation". The "Uniform Operation of Laws" provision was used to strike down 
the "guest statute", an old legislative act that barred guests in automobiles from suing their host 
drivers. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). The first Malan test is whether a law applies 
"equally to all persons within a class". Id., at 670. If the class is all persons who are injured by 
negligently operated emergency vehicles, then the Malan test fails. The 1993 statutory scheme 
creates two classes of victims: 1) those injured by emergency vehicles in pursuit, or while running 
red lights or stop signs; 2) those injured in any other way by the negligent operation of an emergency 
vehicle. There is no uniformity whatsoever. 
The second Malan test is that "different treatment given the classes must be based on 
differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute". Id., at 670. One 
can only speculate as to the objectives of the 1991 statute. If the objective was to avoid frivolous 
lawsuits, as stated in the 1990 amendments, dividing the victims into these two classes does not have 
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a tendency to eliminate that evil. Frivolous lawsuits come in all varieties, whether based upon 
emergency vehicle pursuits, emergency vehicles running stop lights or stop signs, or by their 
speeding. The only objective that can be surmised is to reduce the liability of public entities by 
creating an arbitrary class of victims who cannot recover at all for negligent operation of emergency 
vehicles. That cannot be found to be a legitimate legislative objective. The 1993 amendments fail 
the Malan test, and violate the Utah Constitution, Article I? Section 24. 
POINT TWO 
THE APPLICABILITY OF U.C.A. $41-6-14(1993) 
The County argues that the mere fact that emergency vehicle uses either an "audible signal" 
or a 'Visual signal. . . which is visible from in front of the vehicle". The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that the "visual signal" must be "both activated and adequately visible to give the public 
reasonable notice that an emergency vehicle response is in progress". Kouris v. Utah Highway 
Patrol 70 P.3d 72; 2003 UT 19, fl4. Because the question whether the "visual signal" was 
"adequately visible" is a fact question, summary judgment in Kouris was reversed. Further: 
As the intent of emergency visual signals is to warn the public, and not to merely 
cloak emergency vehicles with immunity, the adequate visibility of the signals is one 
factor, among many, to be taken into account when determining the proximate cause 
of an accident and whether the driver qualifies for the emergency vehicle exception 
to the waiver for negligent acts. 
Kouris, at |13 . Kouris has rej ected the assumption of the County that the mere activation of a visual 
signal or an audible signal automatically immunizes an emergency vehicle. The fact sensitive nature 
of determining negligence and proximate cause precludes summary judgment, even in a case 
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involving emergency vehicles. 
Here, Jensen admitted that there were pine trees blocking his view of Clegg. Further, he was 
rounding a curve at a very high speed, from 55 to 80 m.p.h., which would further diminish the ability 
of another motorist to see his lights or hear his warning siren. Under the holding of Kouris, a jury 
could find that the mere activation of visual signals or audible signals is not enough to completely 
immunize Jensen's reckless driving. 
Further facts that should inform this jury decision include the Wasatch County Policy and 
Procedure Manual ("Manual"). The Manual includes "Chapter Three" addressing "Emergency and 
Pursuit Driving". Id., at 3-3-00.00. The stated policy of the Manual is that "At no time will any 
deputy operate a vehicle in an unsafe manner". Id., at 3-3-01.01 "Policy". The statutory requirements 
incorporated into the Manual are those which pre-date the 1993 amendments. These statutory 
requirements specifically include the provision that the "privileges" of operating an emergency 
vehicle "do not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the 
vehicle with regard for the safety of all persons...". Id., at 3-3-01.02 "Statutory Requirements". The 
Manual's procedures state clearly that "Use of lights and/or siren does not relieve the deputy of the 
responsibility to drive safely at all times". Id., at 3-3-01.04(3) "Procedures". The Manual clearly 
states that "No deputy will drive at more than 20 MPH over the posted speed limit in any populated 
area of the county or in any city. No deputy will drive at any speed that is faster than is reasonable 
and prudent considering the existing conditions". Id., at 3-3-01.04(1) "Department Restrictions on 
Emergency Driving". It is undisputed that the deputy here was exceeding 20 MPH over the posted 
speed limit. It is a logical and even compelling inference that he drove faster than was reasonable 
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and prudent. 
There is ample evidence that the County has adopted a standard of care of reasonableness and 
prudence under the existing circumstances. Its deputies are trained and required to so act. For the 
County now to claim that its deputies have no duty to drive safely so long as their visual or audible 
signals are activated flies in the face not only of logic and common sense, but of its own Manual. 
Given the facts surrounding this case, summary judgment should not be granted, applying U.C.A. 
41-6-14(1993) to completely immunize a reckless deputy without regard to his speed or judgment 
in driving. 
The fact that Deputy Jensen was completely confused as to Wasatch County policy on speed 
in response to an emergency shows a lack of adequate training. Had Jensen been going 55 m.p.h., 
he could have stopped without hitting Clegg. This makes the proximate cause of the accident the 
County's failure to train Jensen, which is separate from Jensen's own liability or not. 
POINT THREE 
ON REMAND. THE JURY SHOULD BE ADVISED OF THE APPLICABILITY 
OF THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT MANUAL STANDARDS ON 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE DRIVING 
A. THE MANUAL APPLIES BECAUSE THE ACCIDENT HAPPENED IN A CITY 
The Sheriffs Manual forbids speeds more than 20 m.p.h. over the posted speed limit "in any 
populated area of the county or in any city." This clearly prohibits pursuits at speeds more than 20 
m.p.h. over the speed limit, "in any city", regardless of the population. The "populated area" 
limitation only applies to areas in the county. This is clear as a matter of English grammar by the use 
of "in" twice: 1) "in any populated area of the county"; or 2) "in any city". Bonner's construction 
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only makes sense if one completely removes the words "or in any city". Because the Manual forbids 
pursuit at more than 20 m.p.h. over the posted speed limit "in any city", Bonner's opinion that the 
accident did not occur in a "populated area" is irrelevant. This accident happened in Midway City, 
as shown by the photographs taken by Kevin Robson and the maps attached to his affidavit. In 
particular, Exhibit 5 to the Affidavit of Kevin K. Robson ("Robson Affidavit") clearly shows the 
sign "Midway City" with the accident location behind i t (R: 335-359, at 341). The Manual applies 
because the 20 m.p.h. prohibition includes pursuit "in any city", and Midway City is "any city". 
B. THE MANUAL APPLIES BECAUSE THE ACCIDENT HAPPENED IN A "POPULATED 
AREA" 
The applicability of the Wasatch County Sheriffs Manual was disputed by the County. 
Wasatch County submitted the affidavit of Todd Bonner, who ventured the opinion that the Manual 
was inapplicable because the accident did not happen "in any populated area". (R. 324-5, ^ [4-5). This 
argument is a joke, as the accident happened in Midway City limits, in front of the residences of a 
number of people, and as CI egg was exiting the driveway to the "The Hamlet" condominiums, a 
development of more than 49 units, all or nearly all of which are occupied. The photographs attached 
to the Robson affidavit, taken from the scene of the accident, clearly show the residential, 
"populated" nature of the location. (R. 335-359). The zoning statement makes clear the "residential" 
nature of the area, with "a minimum of vehicular and pedestrian traffic". There are at least 50 
households within 100 yards of the accident scene, and, one might surmise, at least 250 people living 
within 100 yards of the accident scene. For Bomier to state that this is not a "populated area" is 
beyond imagination. His testimony to that effect at trial will be completely unbelievable. The fact 
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that he is willing to take such an unbelievable position sheds doubt on the testimony of his officer, 
Deputy Jensen. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED THE BONNER 
AFFIDAVIT AND STRUCK THE ROBSON AFFIDAVIT 
The Bonner affidavit was another instance of the tactic of Wasatch County adding affidavits 
and new arguments in reply memoranda. This is prohibited by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) which states 
that "the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters 
raised in the memorandum in opposition". This must be read in connection with the requirement that 
"Each fact shall be . . . supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits . . ." . Utah R. 
Civ. P.7(c)(3)(A), and further, that the opposing party make a statement of "each of the moving 
party's facts that is controverted... [and] an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported 
by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits...". Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). The rules clearly 
contemplate that all supporting materials be filed with the original motion, including affidavits. 
Otherwise, a party resisting a motion cannot "controvert" the facts supporting the motion for 
summary judgment. 
Further, the Bonner affidavit merely makes inadmissible "arguments" rather than stating 
specific facts. In contrast, the Robson affidavit clearly sets for admissible "facts" from which the jury 
could find that the Manual applied. The argument of Wasatch County that the Robson affidavit was 
improper as counsel testifying overlooks Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). Rule 5 6(f) clearly allows the affidavit 
of counsel in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Because the issue of the applicability 
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of the Manual was actually raised BY THE COURT in its first ruling on the motion of Wasatch 
County for summary judgment, and Wasatch County first raised the argument that the accident did 
not occur in a city or populated area in a supplemental memorandum to that ruling, Clegg had no 
other way of resisting the belated argument of Wasatch County. Certainly Clegg had no opportunity 
to do discovery on the issue and to properly support his argument that the Manual applied, BEFORE 
the motion for summary judgment on governmental immunity was raised,- and in the course* of 
briefing that motion. It was error to mis-construe the Robson affidavit as anything other than a Rule 
56(f) type of affidavit, given the very unorthodox way that the issues were raised by the trial court 
and Wasatch County. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Legislature attempted to raise from the dead, blanket immunity for emergency 
response vehicles, like Lazarus of old. The statute that it created in 1993 failed the Article 11 test, 
and the Uniform Operation of Laws test of Section 24. This is made even more apparent by the 2004 
amendments that essentially concede the issue, and bring the statute in line with Day. 
The Bonner affidavit is merely argument by counsel disguised as . . . well, argument by 
counsel's witness. The Robson affidavit clearly is based upon admissible facts, and should have been 
considered by the trial court in light of the highly unusual procedural posture of the case. The trial 
court's summary judgment should be reversed. / 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ETC 
Linette B. Hutton (#6408) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Facsimile: (801) 322-2282 
Attorney for Wasatch County Defendants 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County. State of Utah 
shfoi W\ jjeputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, HEBER CITY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE CLEGG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WASATCH COUNTY and BRUCE T. 
JENSEN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN 
ROBSON; DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
CHIEF DEPUTY BONNER 
Civil No.: 030500422 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on April 19, 2007, for oral argument on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Kevin 
Robson and the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Chief Deputy Todd Bonner. The Plaintiff 
was represented by Kevin K. Robson, Bertch, Robson Attorneys and Defendants by Linette B. Hutton, 
Winder & Haslam, P.C. Following oral argument from counsel, the Court's examination of the pleadings 
and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and 
adopts and incorporates the arguments set forth m Defendants' memoranda on all issues and particularly 
finds there is no factual issue as to speed to defeat summary judgment, the Court further GRANTS 
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Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Kevin Robson and DENIES the Plaintiff s Motion to Strike 
the Affidavit of Chief Deputy Todd Bonner 
Kevin K Robson 
Attorney for Plaintiff Steven Clegg 
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